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I. INTRODUCTION

Nevada is the driest state in the Nation.'
Average annual
precipitation is a scant nine inches, with some parts of the state
receiving four inches or less. Bordered on the west by the massive
Sierra Nevada Mountains, the majority of the state lies in a vast rain
shadow, formed when the moisture laden westerlies rain across an

t Sylvia Harrison, B.S., M.S., Montana State University, Ph.D., J.D. University of
Montana. Ms. Harrison is a partner in the Reno and Las Vegas, Nevada law firm of
McDonald Carano Wilson McCune Bergin Frankovich & Hicks LLP. She practices
primarily in the area of natural resources and environmental law. Matthew C. Addison
and Scott Gronek of the firm provided editorial assistance in the preparation of the
manuscript.
1. Nevada
Division
of
Water
Planning,
Nevada
Water
Facts,
http://www.state.nv.us/cnr/ndwp/wat-fact/precip.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2001). In
2000, The Nevada Division of Water Planning merged with the Nevada Division of
Water Resources.
The Division of Water Planning's website is not currently
maintained, but it contains a wealth of information regarding Nevada water resources,
including comprehensive historical information regarding several of the state's major
rivers. Id.
2. Id.
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upslope course spanning the range. Although a desert, the state is not
flat. Nevada lies in the "Basin and Range" physiographic province.
More than 160 north-south trending mountain ranges divide the state,
creating dry, isolated valleys.3
Nevada's few rivers would be brooks by eastern standards. The
combined volume of the Carson, Truckee, and Walker Rivers at their
maximum average annual flows is less than 2,000 cubic feet per
second, about a tenth of the volume of the lower reaches of the
Connecticut River. The total length of each measures a few hundred
miles or less. Their abbreviated watercourses rise in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains and plunge down the eastern slopes through steep rocky
canyons and narrow valleys to end in land locked lakes or sinks.5 The
Humboldt, the only sizeable stream that begins and ends within the
state, wanders westward through the maze of mountains and ends in a
vast interior sink. 6 The state's only "river sized" river is the Colorado.
It glances off the southern tip of the state and delivers Nevada's scant
Colorado Compact allocation on its way to serve the requirements of
her neighbors.

The scarcity of Nevada's water is the defining circumstance of its
water laws. Throughout its history, Nevada has confronted the task of
resolving monumental contests over the rights to this critical resource.
This paper tracks the evolution of Nevada's statutes governing the
administration of water use, as the state has struggled to mold a legal
framework to accommodate the physical realities of its harsh and
beautiful lands.
The scope of this paper is limited to a discussion of the evolution
of the common law to form the foundation of Nevada's appropriation
doctrine, and the history of the codification of its laws administering
water rights. The discussions include the development of groundwater
appropriation statutes and the progression of laws governing the loss
No attempt is made to trace the numerous
of water rights.
amendments and modifications of these laws, except where these
changes represent major departures from the basic appropriation
This paper does not consider the several
doctrine framework.
hundred pages of Nevada statutes governing the administration of
irrigation and water conservancy districts, ditch companies, and water
authorities. As discussed in the concluding sections of this paper,
Nevada statutes along with a complex system of federal decrees and
decisions, interstate compacts and contracts govern the administration
of Nevada's water. It would be impossible to do justice to the sagas
3.

RUSSELLR. ELuOTr, HISTORY OF NEVADA 1 (2d ed. 1987).

4. See United States Geological

Survey, Surface Water Data for USA, at

http://water.usgs.gov/nwis/annual (last visited Aug. 12, 2001).
5.

NEVADA WRITERS'

PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROJECT ADMINISTRATION, THE WPA

GUIDE TO 1930s NEVADA 6 (1991).

6. Id.
7. Id. Nevada's allotment of Colorado River water is about 4 percent of the total
allocation to California, Arizona and Nevada. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 342
(1964).
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behind this aspect of Nevada water law in a paper of this length, and
these facets of water allocation and distribution systems are addressed
only to the extent necessary to provide essential context for statutory
developments.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
The national politics of the Civil War era shaped Nevada's early
history. The national political agendas of two of Nevada's most
prominent early citizens, William M. Stewart and Francis G. Newlands,
profoundly influenced the evolution of its water laws.
In 1848, the United States gained possession of the lands that
make up Nevada, California, Utah, and the majority of lands in
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming, through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.8 Unlike California, which had already felt the
impact of two centuries of American and European tradesmen and
missionaries, Nevada was virtually unsettled in the mid-nineteenth
century.
The acquisitions of the Mexican Cession sparked two years of
national debate over how to administer the lands in order to satisfy the
competing interests of the "slave" and "antislavery" states.9 By the
terms of the Compromise of 1850, Congress admitted California as a
free state, and divided the remaining Cession lands into the territories
of Utah and New Mexico, with the stands of these territories on the
issue of slavery to be deferred until statehood.'0
Most of present day Nevada was included within the Utah
Territory, and in the early 1850s Mormon settlers made their way to
the Carson Valley, below the Sierra Nevada on the Territory's western
edge." Despite the early settlers' pleas for a serious commitment to
Nevada's governance, the territorial government more or less ignored
the state. Most of the Mormon settlers returned to the Salt Lake City
area in 1856 and 1857 to assist their brethren in the so-called
"Mormon wars," leaving only a few hundred settlers in the Carson
Valley."
Among the remaining immigrants were prospectors panning for
gold in the area near Dayton, a frequent rest stop on the Carson River
en route to the California gold fields. 3 During the 1850s, prospectors
commonly spent winters mining in California, returning to the Carson
Valley area in the summer. These miners recovered respectable
quantities of gold in the stream placers of Gold Canyon, prompting
exploration for the upstream "mother lode" and leading to the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. 4, 9 Stat. 922.
ELuoTT, supranote 3, at 51.
Id.
Id. at52.
Id. at 56-57.

13.

BECKY WEIMER PURKEY & LARRYJ. GARSIDE, GEOLOGIC AND NATURAL HISTORY

TouRs INTHE RENO ARA 56 (1995) [hereinafter PuREY & GARSIDE].
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discovery of gold on the Comstock fault in 1859.4 Initial efforts by the
miners to concentrate free gold through placer operations were
hampered by blue clay that fouled the equipment. When some
farsighted and forgotten miner assayed the clay, it proved to be an
immensely rich silver ore.1 5 Underground mining operations along
the Comstock fault soon led to the discovery of ore bodies yielding
fabulous quantities of silver and gold. 6
The influx of miners following the discovery of the Comstock lode
added to the area's political chaos and increased the pressure on
Congress for recognition of Nevada as a separate territory. Members
of Congress from southern states opposed territorial status for Nevada,
as these states were struggling to maintain a balance between the slave
and free states. 7 In 1861, however, following the southern states'
secession from the Union and the formation of the Confederacy,8
Nevada.
Congress quickly passed a bill recognizing the territory of
The next three and a half years of Nevada's political history are rife
with stories of intrigue, scandal and corruption, which provided ample
fodder for the Comstock's famous TerritorialEnterpriseand young Mark
Twain.1
National political agendas dominated the development of Nevada's
government. Congress granted Nevada statehood on October 31,
1864, just in time for the new state's citizens to participate in the
November national election and help reelect President Lincoln. In
December, Nevada's new legislature elected two fledgling senators,
James W. Nye and the prominent Comstock attorney, William M.
Stewart. The new senators reached Washington in time to register
their votes favoring the Thirteenth Amendment."
Within a decade of Nevada's statehood, more than 35,000 people
crowded into the dry, mountain towns of the Comstock lode, with
25,000 in Virginia City, and 9,000 to 10,000 in Gold Hill.2' Water
posed a significant problem for the Comstock-too much in the
mines, and too little in the towns. These conditions inspired two
remarkable feats of engineering, the Sutro Tunnel 22 and the Virginia
and Gold Hill Water Company water supply system.25
In 1865, Albert Sutro presented a proposal to the state legislature
to solve the horrendous conditions of hot water and poor ventilation
the underground miners faced on the Comstock.24 Sutro proposed to
drive a horizontal tunnel, about four miles long, into the side of Mt.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 58.

16. Id.
17.

ELuoTr, supranote 3, at 68.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 84-89.
Id. at 89.
PuRXEY& GARSIDE, supra note 13,

Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 85.

24. Id.

at 62.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 5

Davidson. The tunnel would provide a deep drain for the mines,
enhance ventilation, and act as a conduit for ore and miners. The
legislature reacted enthusiastically, perhaps because Sutro had
convinced William M. Stewart to act as president of his company.
Sutro and his associates received an exclusive franchise for the
project. 5 Powerful mining interests saw the tunnel as a threat to their
economic domination of the Comstock and successfully obstructed
Sutro's efforts to capitalize the project. 26 William P. Sharon was chief
among Sutro's opponents. 27 Sharon succeeded Stewart as the "boss" of
the Comstock and was a primary figure in the so called "Bank Crowd,"
the group of financiers of the Bank of California, which controlled the
Comstock from 1867 to 1875.8
Construction of the Sutro tunnel did not begin until 1869, after a
fatal fire in one of the mines mobilized support for the venture. 2' The
physical challenge of constructing the tunnel was as daunting as the
financial challenge. The tunnel did not reach completion until 1878,
just as the mines of the Comstock were approaching exhaustion. 0
At the same time construction of the Sutro tunnel was underway,
the Comstock was addressing its needs for a fresh water supply through
construction of a remarkable system of flumes and pipelines to car 7
water from the Carson Range of the Sierra Nevada to Virginia City.
The system captured water from Hobart Creek and Marlette Lake, just
east of Lake Tahoe. The system then carried the water through
flumes, and ditches, and an "inverse siphon"-a high-pressure pipeline
operating by natural hydraulic pressure-to feed the water across
Washoe Valley into the hills above Gold Hill and Virginia City.
Completed in 1873, the water system was more than twenty-one miles
long and capable of delivering more than two million gallons per day.33
The Sutro tunnel and the Comstock water system are described in
detail above because they illustrate so well the fundamental
underpinnings of Nevada water law. For those who would unlock
Nevada's vast mineral wealth and develop its agricultural and
industrial potential, water would have to be managed, manipulated
and moved; those charged with charting Nevada law would ultimately
have to embrace that reality.

25.
26.
27.
28.

ELuoTr, supra note 3, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
PuRKEY& GARSIDE, supra note 13, at 61.

29.
30. Id. at 61-62.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-88.
Id.
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M. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
A. FOUNDATIONS: THE MINING LAW OF 1866
The development of the appropriation doctrine was fostered by
the evolution of federal laws governing the appropriation of minerals
from the public domain. 4
Until the California Gold Rush,
unauthorized mining on public lands was an actionable trespass.3 5
Local customs of "first in time, first in right," however, governed the
appropriation of minerals from vacant public lands in the West. When
California entered the Union in 1850, it brought with it asrOwerful
mining lobby, intent on preserving these appropriated rights.
William M. Stewart, who dominated Nevada's early territorial and
state politics, profoundly influenced the development of national
mining policies and indirectly helped establish the appropriation
doctrine. As a United States senator, one of Stewart's first tasks was to
draft a policy addressing the vast mineral wealth of the new western
states. Stewart, who amassed his wealth and power as a spokesman for
large California and Nevada mining interests, had an obvious interest
in preserving the rights of miners to free entry and appropriation of
minerals on the public domain."
The Mining Act of 1866, written principally by Stewart, legalized
existing mining claims on public lands and opened mineral lands of
the public domain to exploration according to local customs. 8
Significantly, for the development of water laws, the Act also provided:
That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
same; and the right of way of the construction of ditches and canals
39
for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged ....
The Act thus recognized the significance of "priority of possession"
and helped limit the boundaries of federal claims to water.

34. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAw 77-80 (2d ed. 1997); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 321-24 (2d ed. 1991).

35. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 120 (1845).
36. Sylvia L. Harrison, Comment, Disposition of the Mineral Estate on United States
PublicLands: A HistoricalPerspective, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 131, 146 (1989).
37. MICHAELW. BowERs, THE SAGEBRUSH STATE 108 (1996).
38. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866).
39. Id.
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B. FOUNDATIONS: EARLY DECISIONS OF THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT
The vast majority of Nevada lands were (and remain) public
domain. ' The proliferation of appropriative water rights on public
lands and the Mining Act of 186 6's validation of those rights
sometimes obscures Nevada's early deference to riparian principles.
In reality, the Nevada Supreme Court did not immediately endorse
wholesale application of the appropriation doctrine, but struggled for
several decades to harmonize the common law with common sense.
The facts of the following cases are described in some detail here to
illustrate the balancing of competing interests and equitable principles
that shaped the foundations of Nevada water law.
As early as its second decision, the Nevada Supreme Court was
confronted with a dispute over water rights. In Geller v. Huffaker,"
Geller sought monetary damages for Huffaker's alleged diversion of
water from Geller's ranch.4 2 The plaintiffs contended they were
entitled to the water of Thomas Creek not only as the riparian owners,
but also by virtue of their prior appropriation.43 A significant issue in
the case was the location of the natural channel of the stream, which
Huffaker contended flowed through his property.4 At trial, plaintiffs
called a witness to testify on their behalf. The witness admitted that
because he owned property upstream from plaintiffs, and on the same
channel plaintiffs contended to he the natural channel, he had an
interest in the action.4' The issue before the court was the alleged
error in allowing this witness to testify.4 6 The court noted the legal
question of the witness' competence did not turn on the application of
either the riparian or appropriative doctrines, acknowledging the
existence of the competing doctrines, but avoiding comment on the
47
issue.
Lobdell v. Simpson 8 was the first Nevada case to squarely consider
the appropriation doctrine. This case is sometimes cited for the
proposition that Nevada had adopted the appropriation doctrine.
Such a reading is too expansive, since riparian rights were not at issue
at all in the case. Neither party in Lobdell was a riparian owner; both
were occupants of public lands.49 The plaintiff diverted water from
Desert Creek through dams and ditches. The alleged error that
brought the case to the Nevada Supreme Court was the district court's

40. Federal lands make up about 86 percent of the area of Nevada. ELLIOTr, supra
note 3, at 342.
41. Gellerv. Huffaker, 1 Nev. 22 (1865).
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gellr, 1 Nev. at 23-24.
47. Id.
48. Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274 (1866).
49. Id. at 278.
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failure to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs water right was limited to
the amount of water appropriated prior to the defendants' diversion."
The court found that where the right to the use of running water is
based upon appropriation, and not upon an ownership in the soil, the
first appropriator has the superior right as against subsequent
appropriators. That right, however, did not extend to a right to make
new dams or diversions of water to the detriment of the subsequent
appropriator.51 The subsequent appropriator has the right to have the
water continue to flow as it flowed when he made his appropriation. 2
The Lobdell decision established two principles of Nevada water law
that have remained intact ever since. As between appropriators, first
in time is first in right, but even a senior appropriator is not entitled to
change the manner or amount of his water use in derogation of the
rights of subsequent appropriators.
Competing appropriators were also the contestants in the court's
next significant water rights decision, Ophir Silver Mining Co. v.
Carpenter." In 1858, the original appropriator, J.H. Rose, constructed a
ditch to convey water from the Carson River to the town of Dayton."
The ditch, about four and a half miles long, varied in dimensions from
sixteen feet wide at its immediate head to an average of about three
feet wide and two and a half feet deep at its lower end. 5 In 1862, Rose
conveyed the ditch to the defendants below, Shanklin and McConnell,
who immediately began to enlarge the ditch. 6 When Shanklin and
McConnell completed the enlargement in 1865, the ditch was capable
of delivering fifty-seven cubic feet per second. The original ditch had
delivered a volume of approximately four and a half cubic feet per
second.
In 1859, the grantors of the plaintiff below, the Ophir Silver
Mining Company, began to divert water from the Carson River below
the head of the Rose ditch, completing their own ditch and using the
water for "motive capacity.""8
The enlargement and increased

50. Id.
51. Id. at 279.
52. Id.
53. Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534 (1869).
54. Id. at 542.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 542-43.
57. Id. at 543. Fifty-seven cubic feet per second is a substantial portion of the flow
of the Carson River. Today, the annual average flow of the river at Carson City is
about 400 cubic feet per second, but flow rates vary widely from year to year and
season to season. On July 2, 2001, the Carson River was flowing at only ten cubic feet
per second through Carson City.
58. OphirSilver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 543. Although the decision does not elaborate
on the use of the water, it is likely that the plaintiffs used the water from the ditch to
power a stamp mill. The ores of the Comstock lode were difficult to refine compared
to those of California. By 1860, miners had developed the "Washoe process" to refine
the ores. This process required crushing the ores and treating them with mercury. By
the 1870s, water wheel powered stamp mills lined the Carson River near Dayton. See
PuRKEY & GARSIDE, supra note 13, at 75-77.
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diversions through the Rose ditch diminished the water available to
59
the plaintiff, who sought monetary damages and injunctive relief.
The defendants contended their appropriative rights related back to
Rose's original construction of the ditch and should be measured by
the volume of the ditch at its head, on the basis that such volume was
the measure of Rose's intended appropriation. ° The plaintiff argued
the rights of defendants should be limited to the capacity of the
original ditch."
After reiterating the "first in time, first in right" rule governing
appropriations, the court stated the following principle:
When any work is necessary to be done to complete the
appropriation, the law gives the claimant a reasonable time within
which to do it, and although the appropriation is not deemed

complete until the actual diversion or use of the water, still if such

work be prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the right relates to the
time when the first step was taken to secure it. If, however, the work

be not prosecuted with diligence, the right does not so relate, but
generally dates from the time 62when the work is completed or the
appropriation is fully perfected.

The court found there was no evidence justifying the jury
determination that Rose had shown "reasonable diligence," and
ordered a new trial. 3
[I] t is enough to say that the doing of five or six days' work during a
period of sixteen months, that is from the fall of 1859 to the month
of May, 1861, and only three months' labor during a period of two
years and a half, does not exhibit that diligence which the law
requires .... Rose during this time may have dreamed of his canal
completed, seen it with his mind's eye yielding him a great revenue;
he may have indulged the hope of providential interposition in his
favor; but this cannot be called a diligent prosecution of his
enterprise. Surely he could hardly have expected to complete it

durin his natural life by such efforts as were made through this
period. 64isnt
peo

Although the court's incursion into the role of fact finder may
have been suspect, the requirement of reasonable diligence in

completing
diversion works is still a bedrock principle of Nevada water
6
law.

59.

Ophir Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 541-43.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544-50.

64.

OphirSilver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 546-47.

65. The standards applied today are usually more forgiving than those Justice Lewis

employed. See, e.g., Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835 (Nev. 1997) (involving

more than sixteen separate annual extensions from the state engineer to prove
beneficial use).
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While the Lobdell and Ophir Mining Company decisions were
significant steps in the development of Nevada's appropriation
doctrine, the court's next landmark water rights decision veered
66
sharply off that course. Vansickle v. Haines
was the first Nevada case
where the competition between appropriative and riparian rights was
squarely at issue.
Both the respondent, Vansickle, and appellant, Haines, were the
owners in fee of lands
acquired
by patent from the United States. 7
••
•68
Haines acquired his patent in 1864. Vansickle's ownership predated
Haines', and at the time of Haines' patent, Vansickle had long been
diverting and using waters from the natural channel of the water
course in question, Daggett Creek.6 9 The natural channel of the
stream did not run through Vansickle's property, but it did run
through Haines' property. In 1867, Haines began diverting all or
nearly all of the water of the creek in a flume constructed for running
wood.7' Vansickle then brought an action for damages against Haines,
contending he had established a prior right to the stream waters by
appropriation.72 The district court agreed, finding Vansickle had
established a protectable water right through his prior appropriation.73
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed.74 In a lengthy opinion
issued on a petition for rehearing, Justice Lewis distinguished prior
Nevada and California cases adopting the appropriation doctrine,
correctly noting these had involved occupants of public lands and not
riparian owners. 7' Lewis's opinion stated, "[w]e have shown that a
stream is an incident of the land through which it naturally flows; that
it is in fact, a part of the soil itself; that the right to have it continue to
flow is as sacred a right as that to the soil itself.
,76 The court
reasoned the patent from the United States must have conveyed the
water with the land. To underscore the propriety of the application of
the riparian doctrine, Justice Lewis went so far as to quote as authority
the Napoleonic Code (in French) .
Fundamental to the court's reasoning in Vansickle was its
assumption that the United States retained title to the water of the
stream, regardless of any appropriations. In reaching this conclusion,
it had to explain away the language of section nine of the Mining Law

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vansickle, 7 Nev. at 256.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 289-90 (Lewis, C.J., on petition for rehearing).
Vansickle, 7 Nev. at 284-85.
Id, at 288.
Id. at 249.
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of 1866."9
The Court contended this provision did not affect the 1864 patent
at issue:
The act of Congress of July, 1866, if it shows anything, shows that no
diversion had previously been authorized; for, if it had, whence the
necessity of passing that act.... [T]he answer is, that the policy
began with that act, was never in any way sanctioned or suggested
prior to the time of its passage, and therefore has nothing to do with
this case."
Thus, in Vansickle the court adopted the rule that as between a
non-riparian prior appropriator and a subsequent riparian owner, the
riparian owner had the superior right, even if it meant divesting the
prior appropriator of any interest in the water. The Vansickle opinion
survived in Nevada for thirteen years, and its guidelines provided the
basis for establishing the respective rights of many riparian water users.
In Jones v. Adams," the court had to choose between the
application of riparian principles and the recognition of appropriative
rights in a contest between two riparian owners. The court, bolstered
by a series of United States Supreme Court decisions that undercut
Vansickle, approved the application of the appropriation doctrine."
Jones addressed the respective rights of two riparian owners whose
properties bordered Sierra Creek. The district court apportioned the
rights of the parties according to principles of prior appropriation,
basing the allocation on the amounts of water established through
their original diversions and use. 3
On appeal, the appellant
contended that since both parties were riparian owners, who had
acquired their property in patents from the United States prior to the
Mining Act of 1866, the riparian principles of "reasonable use" should
determine their respective rights."'
The court discussed the Vansickle decision at length, particularly its
contention that the Mining Law of 1866 had no retroactive effect.
Since that decision, the United States Supreme Court had expressly
found to the contrary.85 The Jones court cited three particularly
significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Basey v. Gallagher," Jennison
v. Kirk,87 and Broder v. Water Co.8" Basey and Jennison sustained the
validity of local customs under the 1866 Act. Broder expressly found

79.

Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 280.
Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885).
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 445-46.

86.

Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670 (1874).

87. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
88. Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
89. Jennison, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Basey, 87 U.S. 670 (1874).

Issue I

NEVADA WATER LAW

the 1866 Act recognized pre-existing rights of possession, rather than
the establishment of a new principle. '
In Jones, the court found the district court did not err in basing its
judgment and decree on principles of appropriation. The court then
overruled Vansickle to the extent the decision was inconsistent with the
court's views expressed in Jones.9"
While the Jones court gave the nod to the particular application of
the appropriation doctrine at issue and dealt with Vansickle as it was
compelled to do by subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions, it stopped short of outright rejection of the riparian
doctrine. It was not until 1889 that the Nevada Supreme Court finally
and squarely confronted the application of riparian rights to Nevada
water law.
In Reno Smelting, Milling and Reduction Works v. Stevenson," the
respondent, the plaintiff below, a corporation engaged in ore
reduction, asserted that as the riparian owner it was entitled to the
natural flow of water on its land 9 The defendants also owned land on
the river but the district court enjoined them from diverting water
from the plaintiff's dam. As appellants, they urged the court to reject
the common law doctrine of riparian rights.f The Reno Smelting
decision discussed the development of the appropriation doctrine in
the western states at length and commented:
[The] inapplicability [of the common law rule] ...applies forcibly to
the state of Nevada. Here the soil is arid, and unfit for cultivation
unless irrigated by the waters of running streams. The general
surface of the state is table land, traversed by parallel mountain
ranges. The great plains of the state afford natural advantages for
conducting water, and lands otherwise waste and valueless become
productive by artificial irrigation. The condition of the country, and
the necessities of the situation, impelled settlers upon the public
lands to resort to the diversion and use of waters. This fact of itself is
a striking illustration, and
95 conclusive evidence of the inapplicability
of the common-law rule.
The court concluded, "the common-law doctrine of riparian rights
is unsuited to the condition of our state, and that this case should have
been determined by the application of the principles of prior
appropriation.
Twenty-five years after statehood, the courts finally

laid the riparian doctrine to rest in Nevada.
Two additional pre-statutory cases merit discussion.
Walsh v.
Wallace considered the relative rights of appropriators on the same
90. Broder, 101 U.S. at 276.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 448 (Nev. 1885).
Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317 (Nev. 1889).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317-22.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.

97. Walsh v. Wallace, 67 P. 914 (Nev. 1902).

WATER LA W RE VIEW

Volume 5

stream and provided important instruction on the basis for an
appropriative right." The court in Walsh v. Wallace held:
[i] n order.., to constitute a valid appropriation of water, within the
meaning of that term as understood by the decisions of this court and
laws of the state, and, as we believe, by the decisions of the courts and

laws of other states in the arid region, there must be an actual
diversion of the same, with the intent to apply it to a beneficial99 use,
followed by an application to such use within a reasonable time."
0 the court considered
In Ennor v. Raine,"'
the plaintiff's appeal of a
verdict in favor of the defendant.
The defendant, as a prior
appropriator, had entered the plaintiffs property to remove dams the
plaintiff had constructed that interfered with the flows to defendant's
property. Defendant's action prompted plaintiff to bring an action for
trespass."' Relying on the Mining Act of 1866, the court explained a
prior appropriator is entitled to a right of way to convey his water
through channels and ditches constructed prior to the time other
rights attached to lands crossed by these conveyances and that all
subsequent0 2 patentees, owners, and claimants took subject to that

easement.

The Ennor decision completed a series of decisions in which the
court articulated the major principles of appropriative rights. Over
the next few years, the Nevada legislature codified these doctrines,
which remain essentially unchanged today.
IV. CODIFICATION OF NEVADA WATER LAW
A. FRANCIS NEWLANDS AND THE RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902
Nevada experienced a severe economic depression during the last
two decades of the nineteenth century with the decline of mining on
the Comstock lode.' 9 As efforts to find new mineral resources proved
fruitless, Nevadans turned their efforts to the development of
agriculture. Just as Nevada's adoption of the appropriation doctrine
evolved in conjunction with mineral development and the federal
statutes governing mineral rights, the next major step in Nevada water
law, its codification, evolved as a result of the state's new emphasis on
agricultural development and the need for federal legislation to
promote it.
Serious agricultural development in the arid climates of the West
depended on irrigation, and serious irrigation projects required
98. Id.
99. Id. at 917 (citing California, Washington, Oregon, and Colorado cases)
(citations omitted).
100. Ennor v. Raine, 74 P. 1 (Nev. 1903).
101. Id. at 1.

102. Id. at 2.
103.

ELLuorr, supra note 3, at 170.
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federal support. William M. Stewart, returning to the United States
Senate in 1887 after a twelve year absence, once again promoted
federal legislation to further Nevada's interests, he proposed the
creation of a Senate Committee on Irrigation and supporting
hydrographic surveys under the supervision of John Wesley Powell.'
More significantly, Stewart took under his wing Francis G. Newlands,
introducing him to the Nevada political arena, and fostering
Newlands' interest in an issue that was to become both his passion and
steppingstone into national prominence, irrigation.' 5
Newlands, an ambitious young attorney from an impoverished
immigrant family, rose to power in San Francisco after marrying the
daughter of William Sharon. He inherited the task of defending the
Sharon estate against extensive litigation, including the legendary
divorce action against Sharon initiated by Sharon's mistress. 0 6 William
Stewart, who defended the divorce litigation, recognized Newlands as a
potential political ally in his battle to restore the United States' silver
standard monetary system. At Stewart's urging, Newlands became a
resident of Nevada, in part to protect the diversity of citizenship
necessary to keep federal jurisdiction over the divorce case, and in part
to find new ground to pursue his political ambitions after defeats in
California.'
Newlands moved to Carson City in 1888, occupying
Stewart's mansion rent-free.'
Stewart, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Irrigation,
invited Newlands to tour the West to study potential irrigation projects.
Aware of the importance of irrigation as a political issue to Nevadans,
Newlands worked to become an expert on the subject."'9
Newlands' move to Nevada coincided with rapidly escalating
conflicts among water users and the legislature's first attempts to bring
order to Nevada water law. At Newlands' urging, in 1889 the state
legislature enacted an ambitious law"" that created irrigation2
districts,"' authorized the governor to appoint water commissioners,
required the recording of water rights with the county recorders," 3 and
declared unappropriated water of "natural streams" public property,
"and the same dedicated to the use of the people. . . .""s Water users
immediately challenged the constitutionality of the law and filed suit
with the district court in Winnemucca."' In 1890, the district court
104. Id. at 174.
105. WnULJM D. RowLEY, RECLAIMING THE ARID WEST: THE CAREER OF FRANcIS G.
NEWLANDS 40-45 (1996).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 43-44.
108. Id. at 44.
109. Id. at 45-48.
110. Act of Mar. 19, 1889, ch. 113, 1889 Nev. Stat. 107 (repealed 1893).
111. I&§1.

112. Id..§2.
113.
114.
115.

Id.§9.
Id. § 13.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 51-52.
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found the law unconstitutional in that it delegated too much legislative
power to the governor and threatened vested rights." 6 The Nevada
legislature repealed the statute in 1893."'
At the same time the failure of the new law threw the state's efforts
to administer water rights into chaos, tensions between agriculturists
and miners over water use reached a new peak when large ranching
interests on the Carson River diverted virtually the entire stream to
their use, depriving the downstream mills near Dayton of water to
power their ore crushing stamps. Thirty years of litigation on the
Carson River culminated in Union Mill and Mining Co. v. Dangberg."8 In
this case, mill owners sought to enjoin the upstream ranchers from
impairing their use of the water."9 Both sides asserted superior rights
to the water by virtue of riparian ownership and appropriative rights.'20
Like the failure of the 1889 Irrigation Act, this case was a political
embarrassment for Newlands, who was a major stockholder in the
Union Mill and Mining Company, but was at that time attempting to
portray himself as an appropriate representative of all of the state's
citizens. 2' The lawsuit was also a personal inconvenience, since
Stewart was then arranging the purchase of thousands of acres in the
Lahontan Valley at the terminus of the Carson River, which he hoped
to place under irrigation.'22
The ranching interests ultimately achieved victory in the Union Mill
litigation in 1897.2' After recognizing the riparian rights of the parties
established under the rule of Vansickle, the court lamented the
prevalence of ineffectual court decrees and the absence of state
legislation clarifying Nevada water rights:
It is easy enough for the courts to say that each riparian proprietor is
only entitled to use, for the purpose of irrigating his own land, that
portion of the water of the stream which is in excess over the amount
thereof to which all the other proprietors are equally entitled for the
purpose of making a like beneficial use of the water. This rule is
sound enough andjust enough, if there is water enough to go round.
But what is to be done when there is no excess? If the legislature of
the state fails to act, are the courts compelled to simply declare the

rule, and let the parties act under their own interpretation of it?... A
court of equity ought to have power by its decree to reach the ends of
justice.
The court then entered a detailed decree, viewed as a victory by
the ranchers, allocating water between the competing interests and
116.

Id. at 52.

117. Act of Feb. 3, 1893, ch. 127, § 1, 1893 Nev. Stat. 131.
118. Union Mill & Mining Co. v.Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
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123. Union Mill, 81 F. at 120-21.
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specifying allowed seasons of use."'
Despite political setbacks, Newlands continued to champion
irrigation development.
During his successful bid for a Congressional seat in 1892, he made
26
it a central campaign issue, along with remonetization of silver.
Bitter political struggles within the fledgling Silver Party, however,
sidetracked Newlands' efforts to foster federal interest in reclamation
projects. The Silver Party reached its peak in 1899 when Newlands'
unsuccessful challenge for Stewart's Senate seat led to his expulsion
from the party and the final break with his old mentor,1 27 Reelected to
Congress as a democrat in 1900, Newlands renewed his fight for
federal support for irrigation projects, and introduced a national
irrigation bill in 19018 Battle lines in Congress emerged not on the
question of whether the arid lands should be irrigated, but whether
the states or the federal government should implement these projects.
Not surprisingly, given Newlands' experiences in Nevada, a central
theme of his bill was the necessity 12for federal funding, management,
and control of reclamation projects. 1
President McKinley, who strongly opposed federal reclamation
projects, impeded Newlands' efforts for a federal irrigation bill. After
McKinley's assassination in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt actively
supported dam construction and reclamation projects as a national
undertaking. Roosevelt's labors were critical in securing congressional
support for the enactment of Newlands' reclamation bill.2 ° Although
his Republican opponents disparaged Newlands' role in the passage of
the Reclamation Act of 1902,'' the act became popularly known as the
"Newlands Act." This far reaching act directed the Secretary of the
Interior to conduct studies and locate and construct irrigation works
for storage and diversion of water.2 2 It also provided for federal
management of the projects and for entry upon the newly irrigated
lands in conjunction with the homestead laws.n'
The Reclamation Act required Nevada to finally bring order to its
water laws, since sound state water administration of existing rights was
a prerequisite to the initiation of federal projects.
Newlands again
urged the state legislature to consider enacting a comprehensive water
law to complement the federal Reclamation Act. "' 5 The legislature

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
U.S.C.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 121-22.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 70-71.
Id. at 83-88.
Id. at 95-98.
Id. at 98-101.
Id. at 100-104.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 103.
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 1, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
§ 391 (1994)).
Id. § 3.
Id. § 8.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 107.
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responded by enacting the Irrigation Law of 1903.36
The Act's preamble emphasized the primary focus of the
legislation: to provide for the state's cooperation with the Secretary of
the Interior in implementing the federal Reclamation Act of 1902. ",
The preamble quoted estimates from the United States Geological
Survey suggesting that irrigation of the Truckee, Carson, Walker and
Humboldt Rivers could be trebled by "conservation and economical
use," vastly increasing Nevada's population and wealth.'38
The
preamble described the reclamation projects envisioned by federal law
and concluded "every inducement should be held out to the Secretary
of the Interior" to begin construction of the irrigation projects in
Nevada.'
Although the Irrigation Law focused on reclamation
projects, its first section embodied principles that laid the broad
foundation of subsequent water laws:
All natural water courses and natural lakes, and the waters thereof
which are not held in private ownership, belong to the public, and
are subject to appropriation for a beneficial use, and the right to the
use of water so appropriated for irrigation shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right....

The Act provided for the appointment of the "state engineer,"
whose considerable duties included cooperation with the Secretary of
Interior in reclamation projects, inventory of all appropriations on
each stream in the state, and conducting hydrologic surveys of the
streams.14 ' The Act also provided for the state engineer's certification
4
of existing appropriations and forjudicial review of his decisions. 1
Newlands achieved his longtime dream of a Senate seat in 1903
and made sure Nevada claimed the first project constructed under the
new federal Reclamation Act of 1902, the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
Project. Later renamed the Newlands Project, the venture entailed the
construction of a dam and diversion canal that delivered water from
the lower reaches of the Truckee River to the Lower Carson River
Basin and Lahontan Valley. The federal reclamation engineers
completed the project in 1905. 3
Francis Newlands profoundly altered the landscape of Nevada in a
very literal way. The Newlands Project resulted in the irrigation of
136. Act of Feb. 16, 1903, ch. 4, 1903 Nev. Stat. 18 (repealed 1907).

137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 22-23.
139. Id. at 24.
140. Id. § 1. This language echoes language in the Reclamation Act of 1902, which
in section eight provides in pertinent part "[t]hat the right to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated,

and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390.

141. Act of Feb. 16, 1903, ch. 4, §§ 3-9, 12, 1903 Nev. Stat. 18 (repealed 1907).
142. Id. §§ 13-14.
143. See ROwLEY, supra note 105, at 1-7.
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approximately 60,000 acres in the Lahontan Valley and created an
agricultural community in western Nevada that has thrived for a
century. On the other hand, the damming of the lower Carson and
diversions from the lower Truckee River have had serious
environmental consequences, including the disappearance of vast
wedands and the dramatic lowering of the level of Pyramid Lake, thus
preventing the famous Lahontan cutthroat trout and the Pyramid
Tribe's sacred cui-ui fish from sgawning, and leading to the threatened
extinction of the fisheries.
Newlands viewed himself as a
conservationist;1 6 it is hard to know how he would view the
consequences of his most famous legacy today.4 7 Ironically, Newlands
is rarely credited with his significant role in the codification of
Nevada's water laws. Newlands' efforts to bring order to the disarray of
Nevada water rights, and his insistence on federal management of
irrigation projects, have had an impact on Nevada water law equal to
his legacy of concrete and canals.
B. THE ENACTMENT OF NEVADA'S 1913 WATER LAW

In 1905, the Nevada legislature amended the 1903 Irrigation
Law. 148
The amended law added a permit system for new
appropriations requiring a potential appropriator to apply to the state
engineer, provided for public notice of the intended appropriation,
and allowed protests of applications. " 9 The 1905 act provided that
"[i] f there is unappropriated water in the source of supply named and
the appropriation is not detrimental to the public welfare, the [sitate
[e]ngineer shall approve" the application.'
Upon proof of the
"perfected" appropriation, the state engineer would issue a certificate
of the appropriation. Under the act, both the count of appropriation
and the county of use held records of the certificate.
The Nevada legislature repealed the 1903 and 1905 acts in 1907,
replacing them with a consolidated and reorganized act.' Although
there were few substantive differences between the old acts and the
new law, the legislature modified section one to provide all waters of
144. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.
1989). For overviews of the environmental impacts of the Newlands Project see U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, WATER RIGHTS

AcQuIsITON FOR LAHONTAN VALLEY WETLANDS (1995) [hereinafter DRAFT EIS].
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natural lakes and watercourses "not held in private ownership, belong
to the State.. . .""' The 1907 act also added the provision that a right

to use the unappropriated waters of natural watercourses and natural
lakes could be "acquired in the manner provided in this Act, and not
otherwise." I"4
In 1913, the legislature once again made a fresh start, repealing
the 1907 act, 55 and replacing it with comprehensive legislation that
refined the permit system for applications, and most significantly,
included new, detailed procedures for the adjudication of existing
water rights.'56 Section one of the 1913 Water Law ("Water Law")
returned water from the "state" to the "public" and for the first time
included a reference to groundwater. "The water of all sources of
water supply within the boundaries of the state, whether above or
beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public." 5 ' Section
two provided: "[s]ubject to existing rights, all water may be
appropriated for beneficial use as provided in this chapter and not
otherwise."'
Echoing the federal Reclamation Law of 1902 and
Nevada's Irrigation Law of 1903, section three stated: " [ b]eneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of
water."'59
The 1913 Water Law provided for the forfeiture of water rights in
the event of continuous non-use for a period of four years 6 ° and for
cancellation of a permit to appropriate if the applicant were not
proceeding in ood faith to complete diversions and put the water to
beneficial use.'
The Water Law thus codified the "use it or lose it"
principle inherent in the appropriation doctrine.
Like the earlier statutes, the 1913 Water Law continued to
expressly protect established uses:
Nothing in this act contained shall impair the vested right of any
person to the use of water, nor shall the right of any person to take
and use water be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this
act where appropriations have been initiated in accordance with law
prior to the approval of this act. Any and all appropriations based
upon applications and permits now on file in the state engineer's
office, shall be perfected in accordance with the laws in force at the
time of their filing.

153. I § 1.
154. Id. § 7.
155. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified as amended at NEv.
REV. STAT. ch. 533 (2000)).

156. Id.
157. Id. § 1 (codified at NEv. REv. STAT. 533.025 (2000)).

158. Id. § 2 (codified as amended at NEv. REV. STAT. 533.030(1) (2000)).
159. Id § 3 (codified at NEV. REv. STAT. 533.035 (2000)).
160. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, § 8, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified as amended at
NEV. REV. STAT. 533.060(2) (2000)).

161. Id. § 68 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 533.410 (2000)).
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE

1913 WATER LAW

Although modern practitioners focus on the permit system as the
significant feature of the 1913 Water Law, at the time of its enactment,
its system of adjudication of existing rights had far more immediate
and controversial ramifications. By 1913, most streams were fully
appropriated, and the state's attempts to adjudicate the competing
rights met considerable resistance. Despite the Water Law's express
deference to existing rights, the constitutionality of the provisions
governing adjudications was immediately challenged.
Several
constitutional infirmities were alleged, including a lack of due process
in the adjudication system and an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the state engineer, the contention being that the
determination of relative rights to water was a judicial function, and
only the district court could properly exercise that function.'63 It was
also contended the state engineer would necessarily impair existing
rights in determining "relative rights." 64
In Ormsby County v. Kearney,161 the court considered two
consolidated cases regarding the authority of the state engineer under
the Water Law to determine the relative rights of appropriators.1 66 The
court defended the state's right to administer the water rights system
and held the state engineer could lawfully determine water rights for
administrative purposes.
It is difficult to perceive how there may be any effective regulation
or control over the water rights of a stream system like that of the
Humboldt [R]iver and its tributaries, except through some form of
state supervision. This river extends for a distance of about 300 miles,
is in [five] counties and [three] judicial districts. According to the
brief of counsel for respondents in case No. 2115, there are from 700
to 1,000 water users on the Humboldt River system. Undoubtedly
other claimants are constantly applying for water rights on this
system. The state at large is not only interested in protecting prior
appropriators in their rights, but is interested in the conservation of
the waters of the stream system to the end that the largest possible
amount of land may be brought under cultivation through an
economical diversion and use of such waters. To accomplish this
beneficent object, the state has a right to exercise a superintending
control over the entire river system. It is not to be assumed that so
great and so important an undertaking cannot be fairly and
intelligently administered. If so administered, it would seem
that it
167

ought to be particularly advantageous to prior appropriators.

Although the court generally upheld the constitutionality of the
Water Law, it acknowledged that certain provisions of the law could

render a state engineer's decision a final adjudication of property
163. See Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 806 (Nev. 1914).
164. See id. at 806, 819-20 (McCarran,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914).
166. Id. at 803, 806.
167. Id. at 805-06.
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rights, thereby constituting an unconstitutional delegation of authority
to an administrator.'" The principal defect in the law was that the
state engineer's final determination was subject only to appeal to the
district courts. Since the state's constitution did not confer appellate
jurisdiction on the district courts, the appellate process provided for
was essentially void, which had the effect of rendering the state
engineer's determination conclusive. 69
The legislature repealed the offending sections in 1915, and
modified the adjudication procedures to require the state engineer to
bring an order of determination to the district court, where
proceedings could continue until the court entered a final decree. 7 °
Again, water users along the Humboldt River challenged the
constitutionality of the law, this time in federal court.' The federal
court affirmed the constitutionality of the law. The court found "[t]he
power exercised in the ascertainment of water rights for administrative
purposes only is not judicial power in the constitutional sense; nor, in
so far as the engineer is authorized to take evidence and determine
water rights ... is he vested with judicial powers.
merely preliminary....,

What he does is

The constitutionality of the Water Law as amended in 1915 was
again brought to the Nevada Supreme Court in Vineyard Land and Stock
Co. v. District Court.17

The majority upheld the constitutionality of the

statute, finding little new to consider.
Both Ormsby County and Vineyard Land and Stock Company were split
decisions, each prompting long, articulate, and impassioned dissents
by Justice McCarran 7 5 In both decisions, McCarran was chiefly
concerned with the constitutional problems of allowing an
administrative official to adjudicate real property rights. McCarran's
dissents are interesting reading today, particularly in view of
McCarran's prescient grasp of the difficulties of adjudicating existing
rights on streams that were already over-appropriated, and in view of
the fact that many of those rights had been established, or "vested,"
at
6
a time when the riparian doctrine was alive and well in the state.
Once the court validated the constitutionality of the amended
Water Law, the state engineer's office proceeded to process
voluminous adjudications to administer pre-statutory vested rights.
Determining relative rights without impairing existing rights proved as

168. Id. at 811-12.
169. Id. (Talbot, C.J., concurring); id. at 818-19 (McCarran, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). McCarran insisted that this issue was before the court and
that the court should have found the offending provisions unconstitutional. Id.
170. Act of Mar. 29, 1915, ch. 278, 1915 Nev. Stat. 434.
171. Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 884 (D. Nev. 1917).
172. Id. at 906.
173. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Dist. Court, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918).
174. Id. at 168.
175. Vineyard, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918); Ormsby County, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914).
176. Vineyard, 171 P. at 174, 182-85; Ormsby County, 142 P. at 820-23.
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troublesome as McCarran predicted.'" Nonetheless, today more than
a hundred state decrees govern the rights of these surface users and
another sixty or so are in progress."'
The 1913 Water Law remains the framework of Nevada's statutes
governing water rights. The legislature has continued to refine the
law, however, particularly with respect to administrative matters. The
most significant substantive enactments modifying the law include
regulation of groundwater appropriations and recent changes
affecting the forfeiture of surface rights.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GROUNDWATER
APPROPRIATION
Laws applicable to groundwater rights in Nevada evolved on a
separate path from laws governing surface water rights. As discussed
below, these paths ultimately converged, but the disparate treatment
accorded groundwater survived in a confusing legacy.
Mosier v. Caldwelt 9 was the first Nevada decision to address the
right to appropriate groundwater. Beginning in May 1868, appellants
appropriated and used the waters of a spring running upon land they
occupied. The respondents dug wells on their own property in 1869,
and their use of these wells apparently dried up the appellants'
springs.'80 The question the court faced was whether one may "lawfully
dig a well upon his own land, though thereby he destroy the
subterranean, undefined sources of his neighbor's spring?"''
The
court immediately answered the question. "That he may do so, is
undoubtedly the settled law."' 82 The court noted, "there was no visible
connection between the wells and the spring-the flow of the water
being by percolation. '""" As to that water, the court stated "such water

is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the estate itself...
The
court apparently understood the relevant hydrology and recognized
the connection between the wells and the spring, but did not accord
this fact legal significance. Considering that the court decided Mosier
in the same year as Vansickle, the conclusion is not surprising. But for
the fact the case involved groundwater, the factual circumstances of
Mosier are similar to Vansickle, and the court employed similar
reasoning to reach its conclusion.
The Nevada Supreme Court distinguished "percolating" waters

177.
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from spring waters forming a clearly defined subsurface channel in the
case Strait v. Brown.'85 The parties in this case disputed their relative
rights to waters flowing from springs into a large slough and from the
slough into a stream.
The appellants, plaintiffs below ("Strait"),
appropriated and made use of the waters of the stream for irrigation
beginning in 1867."7 In 1875, the respondents ("Brown") began
diverting waters directly from the springs, and Strait sued to restrain
this diversion."' The trial court found in favor of Brown. 8 9 On appeal,
Brown argued that if waters reached the creek, they did so by
"percolation," and thus the law of appropriation germane to
watercourses should not apply.' 90 The court apparently agreed the
appropriation doctrine did not apply to percolating waters; however, it
noted a jury finding that "subterranean channels" connected the
waters.1 9' Therefore, the water at issue was not "percolating" and laws
regulating water in defined channels should govern.'92 "No distinction
exists in the law between waters running under the surface in defined
channels and those running in distinct channels upon the surface.
The distinction is made between [such waters] ...and those oozing or

percolating through the soil in varying quantities and uncertain
directions."'9 3 The court found no uncertainty as to the amount of
water diverted from Strait, and Brown could not have been "ignorant
of the effect which their diversion of waters would produce upon the
plaintiffs lower down the creek."'94 Accordingly, the court applied the
appropriation doctrine, and reversed the judgment in favor of Strait,
the prior appropriator. '9'
The Mosier and Strait decisions illustrate a disconnection between
scientific and legal principles that has complicated the administration
of groundwater appropriation in Nevada. Mosier ignored sound
hydrology, while the court in Strait relied on an unrealistic hydrologic
distinction to reach results consistent with common law principles.
Nevada may have been better served had the court abandoned the
concept of sanctity of "soil" embodied in these decisions and decided
Strait on the straightforward principle that the appropriation doctrine
was the better rule for all Nevada waters. Nevadans today are still
struggling with the task of distinguishing oozing groundwater from
stygian streams. 9
185.
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Id. at 321.
Id.

194.

Strait, 16 Nev. at 324.

195. Id.
196. As discussed infra notes 208 and 213, Nevada's statutory appropriation scheme
for groundwater still distinguishes "percolating" waters from "artesian" waters from
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A third pre-statutory groundwater case deserves mention here, if
only for historic interest. In Cardelli v. Comstock Tunnel Co.,'97 plaintiffs
below claimed a right to half the waters collected and discharged
through the Sutro tunnel, citing appropriation and adverse use.198 The
court found that waters from the tunnel, "developed" only through the
diligence of the constructors of the tunnel, were not subject to
appropriation, and "by such developing they become the property of
those engaged in the enterprise." 99 "Developed" mine water was
ultimately recognized as an appropriable resource."'
As discussed above, the earliest Nevada water laws (the acts of
1903, 1905, and 1907) made no reference to underground waters; in
the 1913 Water Law, however, the provision designating waters of the
state as property of the public expressly included waters "beneath the
surface of the ground.""' Such waters were thus impliedly subject to
the appropriation and application processes set forth in the statute.
Although not expressly discussed in the 1913 Water Law, the common
law right to "percolating" water was not affected by the statute, and the
statutory appropriation system applied only to springs and artesian
waters, or such subsurface waters resembling a "defined" watercourse.
The legislature first explicitly addressed regulation of groundwater
appropriations in 1915.
Significantly, this law expressed what had
only been implied in the 1913 Water Law: "[a]ll underground waters,
save and except percolating water, the course and boundaries of which
are incapable of determination, are hereby declared to be subject to
appropriation under the laws of the state relating to the appropriation
2 ° In effect, the law subjected all groundwater
and use of water.""
to the
1913 Water Law, 0with
the
exception
of
the
odd
category
of
"percolating water." 4 Modern practitioners tend to overlook this
legislation, assuming that regulation of groundwater appropriation was
not initiated until 1939, when the state legislature enacted a
comprehensive act governing appropriation and management of
groundwater. 205 This act restated the principle that underground

"defined aquifers."
197. Cardelli v. Comstock Tunnel Co., 66 P. 950 (Nev. 1901).
198. Id. at 952.
199. Id.
200. 331 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 69, 69-70 (1966).
201. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, § 1, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified at NEv. REV.
STAT. 533.025 (2000)).

202. Act of Mar. 24, 1915, ch. 210, 1915 Nev. Stat. 323 (repealed 1939).

203. Id. § 1. The law also law prohibited "waste" from artesian wells, provided for
casing and capping these, and authorized penalties for violations. Id. §§ 2-6.
204. "Percolating water" is still a recognized category of groundwater under Nevada
law and is defined as "underground waters, the course and boundaries of which are
incapable of determination." NEv. REv. STAT. 534.0135 (2000). Given modern
hydrologic methods, which are capable of determining the course and boundaries of
unconfined aquifers with as much validity as other subsurface waters, the utility of this

definition seems questionable.
205. The Underground Waters Act, ch. 178, 1939 Nev. Stat. 274 (codified as
amended at NEv. REv. STAT. ch. 534 (2000)).
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waters belong to the public.
All underground waters within the boundaries of the state belong to
the public, and subject to all existing rights to the use thereof, are
subject to appropriation for beneficial use only under the laws of the
state relating to the appropriation and use of water and not
otherwise, therefore it is the intention of the legislature, by this act, to
prevent the waste of underground waters and pollution and
contamination thereof and provide for the administration of the
provisions hereof by the state engineer, who is hereby empowered to
make such rules and regulations within the terms of this act as may be
necessary for the proper execution of the provisions of this act."'
The act did not expressly discuss percolating water, but repealed
the 1915 legislation,0 7 and added the following provision:
A legal right to appropriate underground water for beneficial use by
means of a well, tunnel or otherwise that was drilled, bored or
otherwise constructed subsequent to March 22, 1913, can only be
acquired by complying with the provisions of the general water law of
this state pertaining to the appropriation of water.
The act thus subjected all underground waters, with the exception
of domestic wells, 219 to the appropriation system.
As to wells drilled prior to March 22, 1913, the act provided that
the state engineer could not assert supervision over such diversions
until pre-statutory rights had been determined by an appropriate
adjudication and court decree. ° The act provided procedures for the

state engineer to supervise appropriations from artesian basins, giving
the state engineer comprehensive powers 2to regulate extractions and
prevent over appropriation of those basins. 1
provisions
governing
Subsequent
amendments
added
abandonment and forfeiture of groundwater 212 and clarified the
recognition of vested rights. 213 All groundwater in Nevada, with the
206. Id. § 1 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 534.020 (2000)).
207. Id. § 14 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 534 (2000)).
208. Id. § 9. See NEv. REV. STAT. 534.080(1) (2000) which provides as follows:
A legal right to appropriate underground water for beneficial use from an
artesian or definable aquifer subsequent to March 22, 1913, or from
percolating water, the course and boundaries of which are incapable of
determination, subsequent to March 25, 1939, can only be acquired by
complying with the provisions of chapter 533 of NRS pertaining to the
appropriation of water.
Id.
209. The Underground Waters Act, ch. 178, § 3, 1939 Nev. Stat. 274, 275.
210. I& § 4.
211. Id.§5.
212. Act of Mar. 15, 1947, ch. 43, 1947 Nev. Stat. 52.
213. NEv. REv. STAT. 534.100(1) (2000) provides:
Existing water rights to the use of underground water are hereby recognized.
For the purpose of this chapter a vested right is a water right on
underground water acquired from an artesian or definable aquifer prior to
March 22, 1913, and an underground water right on percolating water, the
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exception of certain domestic wells, is now subject to the same
appropriation procedures as surface water. As discussed in the next
section, important distinctions in the treatment of surface and
groundwater remain, particularly with respect to recognition of vested
rights and laws pertaining to abandonment and forfeiture. 4
VI. LOSING WATER RIGHTS IN NEVADA
In addition to statutory regulation of groundwater appropriations,
the second major development of Nevada water law since the
enactment of the 1913 Water Law has been the evolution of laws
governing the loss of water rights. A corollary to the principle that
beneficial use is the basis and measure of the water right is the
principle that those who fail to make use of their right should lose it.
Other fundamental principles of the appropriation doctrine drive
competition among appropriators.
There is no "equitable
apportionment" of water; when water rights exceed water resources,
junior appropriators may go without water. Over-appropriation leads
to a dependence on deliveries from "dormant" rights and competing
appropriators seize any opportunity to divest passive holders of thier
water rights. The evolution of the legal framework governing the loss
of water rights in Nevada is not a question of simple academic interest,
but is critically important to present day allocations of water resources
in the state. Assertions of abandonment and of forfeiture have been
the springboard for voluminous litigation, prompting Ninth Circuit
Judge Fletcher's comment
that "[wiater litigation is a weed that
215
flowers in the arid West."

A. THE SHORT HISTORY OF PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS IN NEVADA

Loss of water rights in appropriation states generally occurs
through abandonment or forfeiture, and in some states, through
prescriptive use of water by an adverse appropriator.
Nevada
recognized prescriptive water rights only briefly.
The Nevada Supreme Court first discussed acquisition of a water
right through adverse possession or "prescription," in Vansickle v.
Haines.16 The court noted in dicta that adverse use of water is
governed by the same rules as adverse possession of land.2

17

The

factors required to establish a prescriptive right were set forth in

course and boundaries of which are incapable of determination, acquired
prior to March 25, 1939. The distinction as to whether water is in a definable

aquifer or whether it is percolating water, the course and boundaries of

which are incapable of determination, is a matter to be determined by the
state engineer.
Id.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 247-249.

215. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
217. Id. at 284.
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Authers v. Bryant,"' and include five years of uninterrupted adverse use,
assertion under a claim of tide with knowledge and acquiescence of
the person having the prior right.1 9
In 1949, the Nevada Supreme Court was confronted for the first
time with the issue whether an appropriator could acquire a
prescriptive right to water against the owner of a vested right when the
period of adverse use had commenced after the enactment of
Nevada's Water Law of 1913. In In re Filippini,2 Filippini applied to
the state engineer to appropriate a portion of Duff Creek.22 ' The state
engineer granted the application.222 The appellant protested the state
engineer's decision and argued he had acquired a prescriptive right to
the use of the waters of Duff Creek, which Filippini's appropriation
would impair. The appeal followed from the dismissal of appellant's
action in district court against Filippini and the state engineer.2 3 In
reaching its decision, the court considered the section of the act
providing all waters of the state "may be appropriated for a beneficial
use as provided in this act and not otherwise."
The court reasoned
that the methods of appropriation set forth in the 1913 statute applied
only to appropriations from the government, and had no application
to a water right acquired by adverse use from an existing owner. 22' The
court explained that the plain language of the law compelled its
conclusion, but urged the legislature to consider modifications to the
law to accommodate a better public policy:
[A]dverse use is wholly unwarranted, unnecessary and clearly

dangerous to the appropriation and distribution of public property.
The travail through which the Nevada water law of this state has
passed in the last forty-six years to bring order out of chaos will be of
no avail if the old rulc of "might makes right" in the appropriation of

water is to continue.
The court noted the forty-fourth session of the legislature had
convened and directed "the attention of the legislature to the
problem."22 7 The legislature took its instructions well; in that same
session, it amended the water laws to prohibit the acquisition of water
rights through prescriptive use.228
218. Authers v. Bryant, 38 P. 439 (Nev. 1894).
219. Id. at 440.

220. In re Filippini, 202 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1949).
221.

Id. at 536.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 537.
224. Id. at 538.
225. Filippini,202 P.2d at 539.
226. Id. at 540.
227. Id. at 541.
228. Act of Mar. 21, 1949, ch. 103, 1949 Nev. Stat. 128. (codified at NEv. REV. STAT.

533.060(5) (2000)).
A prescriptive right to the use of the water or any of the public water
appropriated or unappropriated may not be acquired by adverse possession.
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B. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF FORFEITURE AND ABANDONMENT

Considering the significance of the principles of abandonment
and forfeiture in the administration of Nevada's water rights, it is
surprising Nevada's legislature took so long to effectively articulate
well settled concepts of water loss inherent in the appropriation
doctrine. Section eight of the 1913 Water Law was Nevada's first
statutory provision governing the loss of water rights resulting from
failure to use the water beneficially.2 9 The language the legislature
employed was unfortunate, blurring the significant distinction between
common law abandonment and statutory forfeiture. The section
provided in pertinent part:
Rights to the use of water shall be limited and restricted to so much
thereof as may be necessary, ... and in case the owner or owners ...
shall fail to use the water therefrom for beneficial purposes for which
the right exists during any four successive years, the right to use shall
be considered as having been abandoned, and they shall forfeit all
230
water rights, easements and privileges appurtenant thereto ....
The most significant decision construing this law is the case In re
Manse Spring and its Tributaries .23' The appellant in that case
contended that water rights to irrigate about 300 acres, which had
vested through appropriation and beneficial use in 1910, were lost by
nonuse after the owner's death in 1929.232 The appellant argued that
for a period of about seven years the owner used the water only
passively for livestock watering and domestic use. 33 In deciding this
issue, the court set forth a series of significant principles. First, it
noted that while section eight uses both the terms "abandon" and
"forfeit," these terms "are entirely different in their operation." 23 4 The
court stated: "'While, upon the one hand, abandonment is the
relinquishment of the right by the owner with the intention to forsake
and desert it, forfeiture, upon the other hand, is the involuntary or
forced loss of the right ...required by the statute'."2 5 The court then
considered whether the statutory forfeiture provision of section eight
could apply to pre-statutory water rights in the face of section eighty-

Any such right to appropriate any of the water must be initiated by applying
to the state engineer for a permit to appropriate the water as provided in this
chapter.
Id.

229. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, § 8, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192; see NEv. REv. STAT.
533.030 (2000)).
230. Id. (amended in 1917 to increase the forfeiture period to five years, and
repealed in 1999).
231. In reManse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311 (Nev. 1940).

232.
233.
234.
235.
1912)).

Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Id. (quoting

KINNEY ON IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS,

vol. 2, § 1118 (2d ed.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

four, the section of the 1913 Water Law protecting vested rights." 6
Although expressed in equivocal language, the court's essential
finding was that one could only lose pre-statutory rights by
abandonment. To apply the statutory forfeiture provisions to such
water rights would impair vested rights and contravene the intention
of section eighty-four.2"'
The court does not discuss the source of waters at issue in Manse
Spring in detail in the decision, but the court's discussion makes
apparent that artesian or spring waters would have been subject to the
1913 Water Law, except to the extent of pre-statutory vested rights.
In 1947, the legislature amended the 1939 Underground Waters
Act to provide for the forfeiture of groundwater rights:
Failure for five successive years on the part of the holder of any right,
whether it be an adjudicated right, an unadjudicated right, or
permitted right, and further whether such right be initiated after or
before the passage of this act, to use beneficially all or any part of the
underground water for the purpose for which such right shall be
acquired or claimed, shall work a forfeiture of undetermined rights
and an abandonment of determined rights of the right to the use of
such water to the extent of such nonuse. Upon the forfeiture of a
right to the use of ground water, such water shall revert to the public
and shall
238 be available for further appropriation, subject to existing
rights.
The legislature in this section again blurred the distinction
articulated in Manse Spring between forfeiture and abandonment. The
legislature based the difference upon whether a right was determined
or undetermined, and created "abandonment" by operation of law
regardless of intent. In contrast to the comparable section in the 1913
Water Law governing water in defined watercourses, this section
expressly applied to rights initiated prior to the act. In 1967, the
legislature clarified this section by removing the confusing reference
to abandonment and emphasizing its retroactive application. 2" The
legislature amended the law again in 1981 to limit the section's reach,
providing the period of non-use had to begin after April 15, 1967.240
236. See supratext accompanying note 160.
237. In reManse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311, 316 (Nev. 1940).
238. Act of Mar. 15, 1947, ch. 43, 1947 Nev. Stat. 52. See NEv. REv. STAT. 534.090
(2000), which now provides in pertinent part:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, failure for 5 successive years
after April 15, 1967, on the part of the holder of any right, whether it is an
adjudicated right, an unadjudicated right, or a permitted right, and further
whether the right is initiated after or before March 25, 1939, to use
beneficially all or any part of the underground water for the purpose for
which the right is acquired or claimed, works a forfeiture of both
undetermined rights and determined rights to the use of that water to the
extent of the nonuse.
239. Act of Apr. 15, 1967, ch. 383, 1967 Nev. Stat. 1052 (amended 1981).
240. Act ofJune 14, 1981, ch. 736, 1981 Nev. Stat. 1837 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT.
534.090(1) (2000)). This section of the law contains one of the significant distinctions
between surface rights and underground rights in that the state engineer can initiate
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Town of Eureka v. State Engineer"' affirmed the constitutionality of

retroactive application of the forfeiture statute for underground
waters:
The district court distinguished Manse Spring from the case at bar
because Manse Spring concerned the non-use of pre-statutory surface
water rights, while this case involves permitted groundwater rights.
Also, under the 1913 water law discussed in Manse Spring, the
legislature specifically included a provision that the act would not
impair vested rights created prior to 1913, while current Nevada
water law lacks a similar provision. Finally, contrary to the 1913 water
law, the legislature has affirmatively stated that the forfeiture
provision enacted in 1967 applies to all groundwater rights, even
those in existence at the time of enactment.
The court approved the district court's analysis and held that the
legislature's intent to apply the law retroactively was constitutional.243
The court's analysis distinguishing Manse Spring may deserve a
second look, considering that the water at issue was apparently from a
subsurface source, and considering that the same law that governed
surface water between 1913 and 1939 also governed most groundwater
appropriations. 44 By implication, groundwater appropriations enjoyed
pre-statutory vested surface
protection under the• provision
245
thshielding
fi
If the first factors in the analysis are
rights from forfeiture.
discounted, the court is left with the argument that retroactive
application of the law is constitutional solely because the legislature
intended the law to be retroactive.
C. RECENT CHANGES IN THE LAWS OF ABANDONMENT AND FORFEITURE

Contentious battles over the allocation of surface water rights in
Nevada marked the last decades of the twentieth century, particularly
on the Carson and Truckee Rivers, where increasing urbanization and
conversion of "dormant" agricultural rights to municipal use
threatened historic in-stream flows and new assertions of federal
an action for abandonment for underground rights. Id. NEV. REV. STAT. 534.090(4)
(2000) provides:
A right to use underground water whether it is vested or otherwise may be
lost by abandonment. If the state engineer, in investigating a ground water
source, upon which there has been a prior right, for the purpose of acting
upon an application to appropriate water from the same source, is of the
belief from his examination that an abandonment has taken place, he shall
so state in his ruling approving the application. If, upon notice by registered
or certified mail to the owner of record who had the prior right, the owner of
record of the prior right fails to appeal the ruling in the manner provided for
in NRS 533.450 and within the time provided for therein, the alleged
abandonment declaration as set forth by the state engineer becomes final.
Id.
241. Town of Eureka v. State Engineer, 826 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1992).
242. Id. at 951.
243. Id.
244. See supra text accompanying note 237.
245. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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reserved rights threatened the stability of historic decrees. In both
civil and administrative proceedings, contestants increasingly relied on
claims that competing water rights were abandoned or subject to
forfeiture as a means of protecting their own appropriations.' 6
Reacting to the uncertainty these assaults created on historic
allocations, the 1999 Nevada legislature enacted radical changes to the
provisions of Nevada's laws governing the forfeiture and abandonment
of surface waters. These changes mark significant departures from
established appropriation principles. The legislature modified Nevada
Revised Statutes section 533.060 by deleting subsection (2) and
substituting a new section, which provides: "[r]ights to the use of
surface water shall not be deemed to be lost or otherwise forfeited for
the failure to use the water therefrom for a beneficial purpose. ,,247
As a result of this provision, one can no longer lose a surface water
right by forfeiture. The legislature avoided the obvious key question as
to when this protection should be applied, stating in its preamble to
the legislation (not codified) that:
The amendatory provisions of sections 1, 2, and 3 of this act:
(1) Do not apply to water rights that are under challenge in any
legal or administrative proceeding which is pending on or before
April 1, 1999; and
(2) Do not constitute a legislative declaration that the law to be
applied in anyI such pending
proceeding is different from or the same
248
as set forth in this act.
'

Discarding the last century's development of common law, the
1999 legislature also drastically limited the conditions under which
one could abandon a surface water riht and set guidelines relating to
a presumption of non-abandonment.A
Given the importance of the protection against forfeiture and
abandonment these recent enactments afford "surface" water, it is

246. See generally United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2001).
247. NEv. REv. STAT. 533.060(2) (2000).
248. Act ofJune 8, 1999, 1999 Nev. Stat. 515.
249. NEXv. REv. STAT. 533.060(3) and (4) (2000) now provide in pertinent part:
3. A surface water right that is appurtenant to land formerly used primarily
for agricultural purposes is not subject to a determination of abandonment if
the surface water right: (a) Is appurtenant to land that has been converted to
urban use; or (b) Has been dedicated to or acquired by a water purveyor,
public utility or public body for municipal use. 4. In a determination of
whether a right to use surface water has been abandoned, a presumption that
the right to use the surface water has not been abandoned is created upon
the submission of records, photographs, receipts, contracts, affidavits or any
other proof of the occurrence of any of the following events or actions within
a 10-year period immediately preceding any claim that the right to use the
water has been abandoned: (a) The delivery of water; (b) The payment of
any costs of maintenance and other operational costs incurred in delivering
water; The payment of any costs for capital improvements, including works of
diversion and irrigation; or (c) The actual performance of maintenance
related to the delivery of water.
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likely that attempts will be made to apply the law broadly to all waters
historically appropriated under the 1913 Water Law, including artesian
and spring waters.
Should such attempts be successful, the
uncertainties attending the distinction between percolating waters and
other groundwater will assume renewed significance. The rule of
Town of Eureka is that all groundwater is subject to forfeiture; the rule
of Nevada Revised Statutes 533.060(2) is that all surface water is not.
Whether these rules are settled law is an open question, considering
the court's cursory analysis in the former and the ambiguous
application and uncertain effective date of the latter.
VII. DISCUSSION
The history of the development of statutes governing Nevada water
rights tells only an incomplete story of Nevada water law. In reality, a
complex landscape of federal and state decrees, reclamation contracts
and storage projects, irrigation districts and ditch companies, and
interstate compacts and agreements affect administration of water
rights.
The most significant "extra-statutory" influence on the
construction of Nevada water is the ubiquitous presence of the federal
government in Nevada water rights battles. To some extent, this
federal presence is a direct result of Francis Newlands' insistence on
federal management of reclamation projects. Undoubtedly, the
Bureau of Reclamation (formerly the Reclamation Service) has
profoundly impacted Nevada water resource management and water
allocation litigation. The Bureau of Reclamation has sought to clarify
the rights of irrigation project farmers25 ° and orchestrate monumental
reclamation projects like the Boulder Canyon Project.2 5' At the same

time, the federal government has tried to expand the boundaries in
Nevada of federal reserved rights under the "Winters Doctrine" 25 2 for
Indian reservations, 23 instream flows, 2 4 and stock-watering rights.2 5 5 It

should not be surprising that many significant legal doctrines
patrolling the boundaries of federal versus state sovereignty in water
rights matters have had their genesis in Nevada. 56 While a detailed
discussion of this aspect of Nevada water law is beyond the scope of
250. See, e.g., United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity, Docket No. A-3 (D.
Nev. Sept 4, 1944).
251. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928)

(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).

252. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
253. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); United States v. Walker River Irr.
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
254. In re Relative Rights In And To Monitor Valley, Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Nye, Order (April 28, 2000); State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev.

1988).
255. In re Relative Rights In And To Monitor Valley, Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Nye, Order (April 28, 2000).

256. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (determining state law does not govern federal reserved
water); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
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this paper, some examples are useful in illustrating current dynamics
of Nevada water rights administration.
Federal decrees administer water rights on the Carson, Truckee,
and Walker Rivers. The decrees are a result of litigation the federal
government initiated to obtain water rights for federal irrigation
projects and the Walker River Indian Tribe. In 1913, the United States
Reclamation Service initiated an action against the other water users
on the Truckee River to secure water rights for the Truckee-Carson
Irrigation Project.257 Intended as an amicable adjudication, the case
continued for more than thirty years, ultimately resulting in the 1944
Orr Ditch Decree.5
The Orr Ditch Decree provided only a brief
hiatus in the litigation. By the 1960s and 70s, numerous lawsuits were
pending regarding the rights of the Pyramid Paiute Tribe, which
occupies a reservation surrounding the Truckee's terminus, Pyramid
Lake, and the contractual obligations of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District.5 9 Litigation continued until 1990, when intense negotiations
among the affected parties along the Truckee resulted in the
"Negotiated Settlement."26 The Negotiated Settlement provides for
the purchase of water rights to restore wetlands and instream flows and
requires the implementation of water conservation measures. It also
requires preparation of an operating agreement to govern the
management of storage and stream flows on the river.21'
The
settlement is not yet fully implemented.
Adjudication of the Carson River has been equally protracted and
contentious. The United States initiated litigation in May 1925 to
secure water rights from the Carson for the Newlands Project and to
finally adjudicate water rights on the river.262 The case did not
conclude until fifty-five years later, with the issuance of the Alpine
Decree on October 28, 1980.3 The Alpine Decree was immediately
appealed, and since its issuance, various aspects of the case have
bounced back and forth among the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the district courts and the state engineer's office on a regular basis.
One issue of significance in these cases is whether the Newlands
project rights vested in 1902 for the purposes of state law (and thus
whether they are immune from the forfeiture provisions of the 1913
law), or whether they vested at the time the water actually became

257. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity, Docket No. A-3 (D. Nev. Sept.
4,1944).
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
260. Fallon Paiute Ahoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3294.
261. The Truckee River Operating Agreement is still in negotiation but nearing a
final draft.
262. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980),
affd as modified, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
263. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. at 877.
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appurtenant to a particular parcel of property within the project.2
Although the Ninth Circuit has written several opinions on the subject,
none has yet been conclusive. 65
The third major federal decree, which governs water rights
allocations on the Walker River, was the result of the federal
government's assertion of federal reserved rights for the Walker River
Indian Reservation. 6 Until this litigation, a prior federal decree
("Decree 731"), which the Federal District Court for the District of
Nevada issued in 1919, governed water rights on the Walker River. 67
In 1924, the United States filed an action on behalf of the Walker
River Indian Reservation to establish reserved rights pursuant to the
Winters Doctrine, which had been omitted from Decree 731.2 The
case continued until 1936, when the Federal District Court for Nevada
issued Decree C-125.269

Recent litigation has sought to reopen Decree C-125 to increase
federal reserved rights and to address environmental concerns.2 Like
the Truckee River, the Walker's terminus is a desert lake, and
upstream withdrawals for irrigation have led to declining water levels
and increasing salinity. Similar to the Truckee River System, the
Walker River and Walker Lake support an important fishery and
provide significant resources for water

fowl. 27 '

As a result, some

litigants have attempted to convince Nevada courts to recognize the
public trust doctrine as a means of protecting these resources.
What is apparent from this brief overview is that Nevada's
adjudication system, as codified under the 1913 Water Law, is not the
last word. Patrick McCarran's pessimism over the state's ability to
protect vested rights pursuant to this law has proved well founded.
Litigants are still testing the extent of federal reserved rights and
federal pronouncements regarding the "correct" interpretation of
Nevada's water laws continue to challenge the stability of those laws.

264. See generallyUnited States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (2001).
265. Id. (Noonan,J. dissenting) (arguing that majority misinterprets "Alpine III" and
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Nevada's relative tardiness in regulating the rights of its water users
produced a quagmire of competing vested rights exempted from the
permit system and generated endless litigation and adjudications.
Federal management of the major reclamation projects as well as
emerging theories of federal reserved rights has led to the reopening
of apparently settled decrees, leaving Nevadans guessing about the
long term stability of their water rights. At the same time, the transfer
of water rights to municipalities, local governments, and local water
purveyors in exchange for service commitments is likely to result in
obviating the need for traditional water rights laws as water is
increasingly transformed into a commodity.
Meanwhile, the appropriation doctrine codified in Nevada's
statutes has come under increasing criticism, on the basis that its "use
it or lose it" principle is out of step with modern needs to conserve
water and discourage speculation. 3 Nevada's recent radical departure
from settled principles of appropriation law in its 1999 legislation
eliminating the possibility of forfeiture and abandonment for most
surface water274 may be a bellwether of future erosion of the
appropriation doctrine. It may only be a matter of time before Francis
Newlands' dual legacies of irrigation projects and codified
appropriative water laws are both viewed as relics of a distant and
disappearing Nevada landscape.
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